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Abstract
We study the assortment optimization problem under the Sequential Multinomial Logit
(SML), a discrete choice model that generalizes the multinomial logit (MNL). Under the SML
model, products are partitioned into two levels, to capture differences in attractiveness, brand
awareness and, or visibility of the products in the market. When a consumer is presented with
an assortment of products, she first considers products in the first level and, if none of them
is purchased, products in the second level are considered. This model is a special case of the
Perception-Adjusted Luce Model (PALM) recently proposed by Echenique, Saito, and Tseren-
jigmid (2018). It can explain many behavioral phenomena such as the attraction, compromise,
similarity effects and choice overload which cannot be explained by the MNL model or any
discrete choice model based on random utility. In particular, the SML model allows violations
to regularity which states that the probability of choosing a product cannot increase if the offer
set is enlarged.
This paper shows that the seminal concept of revenue-ordered assortment sets, which con-
tain an optimal assortment under the MNL model, can be generalized to the SML model. More
precisely, the paper proves that all optimal assortments under the SML are revenue-ordered by
level, a natural generalization of revenue-ordered assortments that contains, at most, a quadratic
number of assortments. As a corollary, assortment optimization under the SML is polynomial-
time solvable. This result is particularly interesting given that the SML model does not satisfy
the regularity condition and, therefore, it can explain choice behaviours that cannot be explained
by any choice model based on random utility.
Keywords: Revenue management; Assortment optimization; assortment planning; discrete
choice models; revenue-ordered assortments.
1 Introduction
The assortment optimization problem is a central problem in revenue management, where a firm
wishes to offer a set of products with the goal of maximizing the expected revenue. This problem
has many relevant applications in retail and revenue management (Ko¨k, Fisher, and Vaidyanathan,
2005). For example, a publisher might need to decide the set of advertisements to show, an airline
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must decide which fare classes to offer on each flight, and a retailer needs to decide which products
to show in a limited shelf space.
The first consumer demand models studied in revenue management were based on the indepen-
dent demand principle. This principle stated that customers decide beforehand which product they
want to purchase: If the product is available, they make the purchase and, otherwise, they leave
without purchasing. In these models, the problem of finding the best offer set of products is com-
putationally simple, but this simplicity comes with an important drawback: These models do not
capture the substitution effects between products. That is, they cannot model the fact that, when
a consumer cannot find her/his preferred product, she/he may purchase a substitute product. It
is well-known that choice models that incorporate substitution effects improve demand predictions
(Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2004; Newman et al., 2014; van Ryzin and Vulcano, 2015; Ratliff et al.,
2008; Vulcano, van Ryzin, and Chaar, 2010). One of the most celebrated discrete choice models
is the Multinomial Logit (MNL) (Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1974). Under the MNL model, the as-
sortment problem admits a polynomial-time algorithm (Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2004). However,
the model suffers from the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property (Ben-Akiva and
Lerman, 1985) which says that, when a customer is asked to choose among a set of alternatives
S, the ratio between the probability of choosing a product x ∈ S and the probability of choosing
y ∈ S does not depend on the set S. In practice, however, the IIA property is often violated. To
overcome this limitation, more complex choice models have been proposed in the literature such as
the Nested Logit model (Williams, 1977), the latent class MNL (Greene and Hensher, 2003), the
Markov Chain model (Blanchet, Gallego, and Goyal, 2016), and the exponomial model (Daganzo,
1979; Alptekinog˘lu and Semple, 2016). All these models satisfy the following property: The proba-
bility of choosing an alternative does not increase if the offer set is enlarged. Despite the fact that
this property (known as regularity) appears natural, it is well-known that it is sometimes violated
by individuals (Debreu, 1960; Tversky, 1972a,b; Tversky and Simonson, 1993). Recently, there
have been efforts to develop discrete choice models that can explain complex choice behaviours
such as the violation of regularity, one of the most prominent examples is the perception-adjusted
Luce model (PALM) (Echenique, Saito, and Tserenjigmid, 2018).
While the PALM and the nested logit are both conceived as sequential choice processes, they
have important differences. Probably the most important difference is that the nested logit model
belongs to the family of random utility models (RUM)∗, and therefore can’t accommodate regularity
violations. On the other hand the PALM does not belong to the RUM class, and allows regularity
violations as well as choice overload. In terms of the choice process, in the nested logit model
customers first select a nest, and then a product within the nest. In the perception-adjusted Luce’s
model products are separated by preference levels, so when a customer is offered a set of products,
she first chooses among the offered products belonging to the lowest available level, and if none of
them are chosen then she selects among the next available level, and keeps repeating this process
until no more levels are available or until a purchase is made.
1.1 Our Contributions
In this paper, we study the assortment optimization problem for a two-stage discrete choice model
model that generalizes the classical Multinomial Logit model. This model, which we call the Se-
quential Multinomial Logit (SML) for brevity, is a special case of the recently proposed model known
as the perception-adjusted Luce model (PALM) (Echenique, Saito, and Tserenjigmid, 2018). In
∗This is unless nest specific parameters are greater than one, a case rarely studied in the literature.
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the SML model, products are partitioned a priori into two sets, which we call levels. This prod-
uct segmentation into two levels can capture different degree of attractiveness. For example, it
can model customers who check promotions/special offers first before considering the purchase of
regular-priced products. It can also model consumer brand awareness, where customers first check
products of specifics brands before considering the rest. Finally, the SML can model product visi-
bilities in a market, where products are placed in specific positions (aisles, shelves, web-pages, etc.)
that induce a sequential analysis, even when all the products are at sight. Our main contribution
is to provide a polynomial-time algorithm for the assortment problem under the SML and to give
a complete characterization of the resulting optimal assortments.
A key feature of the PALM and the SML, is their ability to capture several effects that cannot
be explained by any choice model based in random utility (such as for example the MNL, the mixed
MNL, the markov chain model, and the stochastic preference models). Examples of such effects
include attraction, (Doyle et al., 1999), the compromise effect (Simonson and Tversky, 1992), the
similarity effect (Debreu, 1960; Tversky, 1972b), and the paradox of choice (also known as choice
overload) (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000; Schwartz, 2004; Haynes, 2009; Chernev, Bo¨ckenholt, and
Goodman, 2015). These effects are discussed in the next section. In particular, the SML allows for
violations of regularity. There are very few analyses of assortment problems under a choice model
outside the RUM class.
Our algorithm is based on an in-depth analysis of the structure of the SML. It exploits the
concept of revenue-ordered assortments that underlies the optimal algorithm for the assortment
problem under the MNL. The key idea in our algorithm is to consider an assortment built from
the union of two sets of products: A revenue-ordered assortment from the first level and another
revenue-ordered assortment from the second level. Several structural properties of optimal assort-
ments under the SML are also presented.
1.2 Relevant Literature
The heuristic of revenue-ordered assortments, consists in evaluating the expected revenue of all the
assortments that can be constructed as follows: fix threshold revenue ρ and then select all the prod-
ucts with revenue of at least ρ. This strategy is appealing because it can be applied to assortment
problems for any discrete choice model. In addition, it only needs to evaluate as many assort-
ments as there are different revenues among products. In a seminal result, Talluri and Van Ryzin
(2004) showed that, under the MNL model, the optimal assortment is revenue-ordered. This result
does not hold for all assortment problems however. For example, revenue-ordered assortments are
not necessarily optimal under the MNL model with capacity constraints (Rusmevichientong, Shen,
and Shmoys, 2010). Nevertheless, in another seminal result, Rusmevichientong, Shen, and Shmoys
(2010) showed that the assortment problem can still be solved optimally in polynomial time under
such setting.
Rusmevichientong and Topaloglu (2012) considered a model where customers make choices
following an MNL model, but the parameters of this model belong to a compact uncertainty set,
i.e., they are not fully determined. The firm wants to be protected against the worst-case scenario
and the problem is to find an optimal assortment under these uncertainty conditions. Surprisingly,
when there is no capacity constraint, the revenue-ordered strategy is optimal in this setting as well.
There are also studies on how to solve the assortment problem when customers follow a mixed
multinomial logit model. Bront, Me´ndez-Dı´az, and Vulcano (2009) showed that this problem is
NP-hard in the strong sense using a reduction from the minimum vertex cover problem (Garey
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and Johnson, 1979). Me´ndez-Dı´az et al. (2014) proposed a branch-and-cut algorithm to solve the
optimal assortment under the Mixed-Logit Model. An algorithm to obtain an upper bound of the
revenue of an optimal assortment solution under this choice model was proposed by Feldman and
Topaloglu (2015). Rusmevichientong et al. (2014) showed that the problem remains NP-hard even
when there are only two customers classes.
Another model that attracted researchers attention is the nested logit model (Williams, 1977).
Under the nested logit model, products are partitioned into nests, and the selection process for a
customer goes by first selecting a nest, and then a product within the selectednest. It also has a
dissimilarity parameter associated with each nest that serves the purpose of magnifying or damp-
ening the total preference weight of the nest. For the two-level nested logit model, Davis, Gallego,
and Topaloglu (2014) studied the assortment problem and showed that, when the dissimilarity pa-
rameters are bounded by 1 and the no-purchase option is contained on a nest of its own, an optimal
assortment can be found in polynomial time; If any of these two conditions is relaxed, the result-
ing problem becomes NP-hard, using a reduction from the partition problem (Garey and Johnson,
1979). The polynomial-time solution was further extended by Gallego and Topaloglu (2014), who
showed that, even if there is a capacity constraint per nest, the problem remains polynomial-time
solvable. Li et al. (2015) extended this result to a d-level nested logit model (both results under
the same assumptions over the dissimilarity parameters and the no-purchase option). Jagabathula
(2014) proposed a local-search heuristic for the assortment problem under an arbitrary discrete
choice model. This heuristic is optimal in the case of the MNL, even with a capacity constraint.
Wang and Sahin (2018) has studied the assortment optimization in a context in which con-
sumer search costs are non-negligible. The authors showed that the strategy of revenue-ordered
assortments is not optimal. Another interesting model sharing similar choice probabilities to those
of the PALM, is the one proposed in Manzini and Mariotti (2014) which is based on consider first
and choose second process. Echenique, Saito, and Tserenjigmid (2018) showed that the PALM
and the model by Manzini and Mariotti are in fact disjoint. The assortment optimization problem
under the Manzini and Mariotti model has been recently studied by Gallego and Li (2017), where
they show that revenue-ordered assortments strategy is optimal. Another choice model studied is
the negative exponential distribution (NED) model (Daganzo, 1979), also known as the Expono-
mial model (Alptekinog˘lu and Semple, 2016) in which customer utilities follow negatively skewed
distribution. Alptekinog˘lu and Semple (2016) proved that when prices are exogenous, the optimal
assortment might not be revenue-ordered assortment, because a product can be skipped in favour
of a lower-priced one depending on the utilities. This last result differs from what happens under
the MNL and the Nested Logit Model (within each nest). Another recently proposed extension to
the multinomial logit model, is the General Luce Model (GLM) (Echenique and Saito, 2015). The
GLM also generalizes the MNL and falls outside the RUM class. In the GLM, each product has
an intrinsic utility and the choice probability depends upon a dominance relationship between the
products. Given an assortment S, consumers first discard all dominated products in S and then
select a product from the remaining ones using the standard MNL model. Flores, Berbeglia, and
Van Hentenryck (2017) studied the assortment optimization problem under the GLM. The authors
showed that revenue ordered assortments are not optimal, and proved that the problem can still
be solved in polynomial time.
Recently, Berbeglia and Joret (2016) studied how well revenue-ordered assortments approxi-
mate the optimal revenue for a large class of choice models, namely all choice models that satisfy
regularity. They provide three types of revenue guarantees that are exactly tight even for the
special case of the RUM family. In the last few years, there has been progress in studying the
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assortment problem in choice models that incorporate visibility or position biases. In these models,
the likelihood of selecting an alternative not only depends on the offer set, but also in the specific
positions at which each product is displayed (Abeliuk et al., 2016; Aouad and Segev, 2015; Davis,
Gallego, and Topaloglu, 2013; Gallego et al., 2016).
We mentioned that PALM and SML are able to accommodate many effects that can’t be ex-
plained by models the RUM class. We briefly describe each one of them in the following paragraphs.
The attraction effect stipulates that, under certain conditions, adding a product to an existing
assortment can increase the probability of choosing a product in the original assortment. We briefly
describe two experiments of this effect. Simonson and Tversky (1992) considered a choice among
three microwaves x, y, and z. Microwave y is a Panasonic oven, perceived as a good quality product,
and z is a more expensive version of y. Product x is an Emerson microwave oven, perceived as a
lower quality product. The authors asked a set of 60 individuals (N = 60) to choose between x and
y; they also asked another set of 60 participants (N = 60) to choose among x, y, and z. They found
out that the probability of choosing y increases when product z is shown. This is a direct violation
of regularity, which states that the probability of choosing a product does not increase when the
choice set is enlarged, as described by McCausland and Marley (2013). Another demonstration of
the attraction effect was carried by Doyle et al. (1999) who analyzed the choice behaviour of two
sets of participants (N = 70 and N = 82) inside a grocery store in the UK varying the choice set
of baked beans. To the first group, they showed two types of baked beans: Heinz baked beans and
a local (and cheaper) brand called Spar. Under this setting, the Spar beans was chosen 19% of the
time. To the second group, the authors introduced a third option: a more expensive version of the
local brand Spar. After adding this new option, the cheap Spar baked beans was chosen 33% of
the time. It is worth highlighting that the choice behaviour in these two experiments cannot be
explained by a Multinomial Logit Model, nor can it be explained by any choice model based on
random utility.
The compromise effect (Simonson and Tversky, 1992) captures the fact that individuals are
averse to extremes, which helps products that represent a “compromise” over more extreme options
(either in price, familiarity, quality, ...). As a result, adding extreme options sometimes leads to a
positive effect for compromise products, whose probabilities of being selected increase in relative
terms compared to other products. This phenomenon violates again the IIA axiom of Luce’s model
and the regularity axiom satisfied by all random utility models (Berbeglia and Joret, 2016). Again,
the compromise effect can be captured with the PALM.
The similarity effect is discussed in Tversky (1972b), elaborating on an example presented in
Debreu (1960): Consider x and z to represent two recordings of the same Beethoven symphony and
y to be a suite by Debussy. The intuition behind the effect is that x and z jointly compete against
y, rather than being separate individual alternatives. As a result, the ratio between the probability
of choosing x and the probability of choosing y when the customer is shown the set {x, y} is larger
than the same ratio when the customer is shown the set {x, y, z}. Intuitively, z takes a market
share of product x, rather than a market share of product y.
Finally, the choice overload effect occurs when the probability of making a purchase decreases
when the assortment of available products is enlarged. To our knowledge, the first paper that
shows the empirical existence of choice overload is written Iyengar and Lepper (2000). In their
experimental setup, customers are offered jams from a tasting booth displaying either 6 (limited
selection) or 24 (extensive selection) different flavours. All customers were given a discount coupon
for making a purchase of one of the offered jams. Surprisingly, 30% of the customers offered
the limited selection used the coupon, while only 3% of customers offered the extensive selection
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condition used the coupon. Another studies of choice overload are in 401(k) plans Sethi-Iyengar,
Huberman, and Jiang (2004), chocolates (Chernev, 2003b), consumer electronics (Chernev, 2003a)
and pens (Shah and Wolford, 2007). For a more in depth discussion of this effect the reader is
referred to Schwartz (2004). Readers are also referred to Chernev, Bo¨ckenholt, and Goodman
(2015) for a review and meta-analysis on this topic.
2 Problem Formulation
This section presents the sequential multinomial logit model considered in this paper and its asso-
ciated assortment optimization problem. Let X be the set of all products and x0 be the no-choice
option (x0 /∈ X). Following Echenique, Saito, and Tserenjigmid (2018), each product x ∈ X is
associated with an intrinsic utility u(i) > 0 and a perception priority level l(x) ∈ {1, 2}. The
idea is that customers perceive products sequentially, first those with priority 1 and then those
with priority 2. This perception priority order could represent differences in familiarity, degree of
attractiveness or salience of different products, or even in the way the products are presented. Let
Xi = {x ∈ X : l(x) = i} be the set of all products belonging to level i = 1, 2. Given an assortment
S ⊆ X, we write S = S1 unionmulti S2 with S1 ⊆ X1 and S2 ⊆ X2 to denote the fact that S is a partition
consisting of two subsets S1 and S2.
The Sequential Multinomial Logit Model (SML) is a discrete choice model where the probability
ρ(x, S) of choosing a product x in an assortment S is given by:
ρ(x, S) =

u(x)∑
y∈S u(y)+u0
if x ∈ S1,[
1−
∑
z∈S1 u(z)∑
y∈S u(y)+u0
]
· u(x)∑
y∈S u(y)+u0
if x ∈ S2.
where u0 denotes the intrinsic utility of the no-choice option, which has a probability
ρ(x0, S) = 1−
∑
i∈S
ρ(i, S)
of being chosen.
Observe that the probability of choosing a product x ∈ S1 (which implies that l(x) = 1 and
x ∈ S) is given by the standard MNL formula, whereas the probability of choosing a product y that
belongs to the second level is given by the probability of not choosing any product belonging to the
level 1 multiplied by the probability of selecting product y according the MNL again. Note that,
if all the offered products belong to the same level, this model is equivalent to the classical MNL
model. The SML corresponds to PALM restricted to two levels. We provide a full description of
PALM in Appendix A.
Let r : X∪{x0} → R+ be the revenue function which assigns a per-unit revenue to each product
and let r(x0) = 0. We use R(S) to denote the expected revenue of an assortment S, i.e.,
R(S) =
∑
x∈S
ρ(x, S) · r(x). (1)
The assortment optimization problem under the SML consists in finding an assortment S∗ that
maximizes R, i.e.,
S∗ = argmax
S⊆X
R(S). (2)
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We use R∗ to denote the maximum expected revenue, i.e.,
R∗ = max
S⊆X
R(S). (3)
Without loss of generality, we assume that u(i) > 0 in the rest of this paper. We use xij to denote
the jth product of the ith level (i = 1, 2), and mi to denote the number of products in level i. Also,
we assume that the products in each level are indexed in a decreasing order by revenue (breaking
ties arbitrarily), i.e.,
∀i ∈ {1, 2} , r(xi1) ≥ r(xi2) ≥ . . . ≥ r(ximi).
It is useful to illustrate how the SML allows for violations of the regularity condition, a property first
observed by Echenique, Saito, and Tserenjigmid (2018). Our first example captures the attraction
effect presented earlier.
Example 1 (Attraction Effect in the SML). Consider a retail store that offers different brands of
chocolate. Suppose that there is a well-known brand A and the brand B owned by the retail store.
There is one chocolate bar a1 from brand A and there are two chocolate bars b1 and b2 from Brand
B, with b2 being a more expensive version of b1. When shown the assortment {a1, b1}, 71% of the
clients purchase a1 and 8.2% buy b1. When shown the assortment {a1, b1, b2}, customers select a1
49.8% of the time and, surprisingly, bar b1 increases its market share to about 10%, while bar b2
accounts for 15% of the market. The introduction of b2 to the assortment increases the purchasing
probability of b1, violating regularity. The numerical example can be explained with the SML as
follows: Consider A = {a1}, B = {b1, b2} and X = AunionmultiB. With u(a1) = 100, u(b1) = 40, u(b2) = 60,
and u0 = 1 as the utility of the outside option, we have:
ρ(b1, {a1, b1}) = 40
141
·
[
1− 100
141
]
≈ 8.2%.
and
ρ(b1, {a1, b1, b2}) = 40
201
·
[
1− 100
201
]
≈ 10%.
Hence ρ(b1, {a1, b1}) < ρ(b1, {a1, b1, b2}) which contradicts regularity.
Our second example shows that the SML can capture the so-called paradox of choice or choice
overload effect (e.g., Schwartz (2004); Chernev, Bo¨ckenholt, and Goodman (2015)): The overall
purchasing probability may decrease when the assortment is enlarged. Once again, this effect
cannot be explained by any random utility model and it is sometimes called the effect of “too much
choice”.
Example 2 (Paradox of Choice in the SML). Let X1 = {x11}, X2 = {x21, x22}, X = X1 unionmulti X2,
u(x11) = 10 ,u(x21) = 1 ,u(x22) = 10, and u0 = 1. We have
ρ(x0, {x11, x21}) = 1− ρ(x11, {x11, x21})− ρ(x21, {x11, x21})
= 1− 10
12
−
(
1− 10
12
)
· 1
12
= 0.1527,
and
ρ(x0, {x11, x21, x22}) = 1− ρ(x11, {x11, x21, x22})− ρ(x21, {x11, x21, x22})− ρ(x22, {x11, x21, x22})
= 1− 10
22
−
(
1− 10
22
)
· 1
22
−
(
1− 10
22
)
· 10
22
= 0.27.
Hence ρ(x0, {x11, x21}) < ρ(x0, {x11, x21, x22}).
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In the following section we first focus in finding properties that any optimal solution of the
assortment problem for the SML must satisfy. Then, in Section 4, we use those properties to
show the optimality of an extension of the classical revenue-ordered assortments which we called
revenue-ordered assortments by level.
3 Properties of Optimal Assortments
In this section we derive properties of the optimal solutions to the assortment problem under the
SML. These properties are extensively used in the proof of our main result (Theorem 1) in Section
4. We establish bounds on the following: any product offered on any optimal solution, and also
the assortments considered on an optimal solution on each level. We assume a set of products
X = X1 unionmultiX2 and use the following notations
U(S) =
∑
x∈S
u(x), α(S) =
∑
x∈S u(x)r(x)∑
x∈S u(x)
=
∑
x∈S u(x)r(x)
U(S)
and λ(Z, S) =
U(Z)
U(S) + u0
(4)
where Z ⊆ S and Z, S ⊆ X. Note that α(S) is the usual MNL formula for the revenue and,
when S = {x} for some x ∈ X, α(S) = r(x). With these notations, the revenue of an assortment
S = S1 unionmulti S2 is
R(S) =
α(S1)U(S1)
U(S1) + U(S2) + u0
+
α(S2)U(S2)
U(S1) + U(S2) + u0
·
(
1− U(S1)
U(S1) + U(S2) + u0
)
=
α(S1)U(S1)
U(S) + u0
+
α(S2)U(S2)
U(S) + u0
·
(
1− U(S1)
U(S) + u0
)
. (5)
The following proposition is useful to divide a set into disjoint sets, which can then be analyzed
separately.
Proposition 1. Let S ⊆ X and S = H ∪ T with H ∩ T = ∅. We have
α(S) =
α(H)U(H) + α(T )U(T )
U(S)
. (6)
Proof.
α(H)U(H) + α(T )U(T )
U(S)
=
∑
x∈H r(x)u(x)
U(H) · U(H) +
∑
x∈T r(x)u(x)
U(T ) · U(T )
U(S)
/using definition of α(·)
=
∑
x∈H r(x)u(x) +
∑
x∈T r(x)u(x)
U(S)
/cancelling U(H) and U(T )
=
∑
x∈S r(x)u(x)
U(S)
/using that H ∪ T = S
= α(S). /definition of α(S)
The next proposition is useful to bound expected revenues.
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Proposition 2. Let S1, S2 ⊆ X. If ∀x ∈ S1, ∀y ∈ S2, r(x) ≥ r(y), then α(S1) ≥ α(S2).
Proof. If ∀x ∈ S1, ∀y ∈ S2 : r(x) ≥ r(y), then minx∈S1 r(x) ≥ maxy∈S2 r(y). We have
α(S1) =
∑
x∈S1 u(x)r(x)∑
x∈S1 u(x)
≥ min
x∈S1
r(x) ·
∑
x∈S1 u(x)∑
x∈S1 u(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
≥ max
y∈S2
r(y)
∑
y∈S2 u(y)∑
y∈S2 u(y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
≥ α(S2).
The following proposition bounds the MNL revenue of the products in the first level. We use
S∗i = S
∗ ∩Xi to denote the products in level i in the optimal assortment, i.e., S∗ = S∗1 unionmulti S∗2 .
Proposition 3 (Bounding Level 1). α(S∗1) ≥ R∗.
Proof. The proof shows that the optimal revenue is a convex combination of α(S∗1) and another
term by using Equation (5) and multiplying/dividing the revenue associated with the second level
by
U(S∗2 )+u0
U(S∗2 )+u0
. We have
R∗ =
α(S∗1)U(S∗1)
U(S∗) + u0
+
α(S∗2)U(S∗2)
U(S∗) + u0
·
(
1− U(S
∗
1)
U(S∗) + u0
)
=
α(S∗1)U(S∗1)
U(S∗) + u0
+
α(S∗2)U(S∗2)
U(S∗2) + u0
· U(S
∗
2) + u0
U(S∗) + u0︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1−λ(S∗1 ,S∗))∈(0,1)
·
(
1− U(S
∗
1)
U(S∗) + u0
)
=α(S∗1)λ(S
∗
1 , S
∗) +R(S∗2) (1− λ(S∗1 , S∗))2 .
R∗ is a convex combination of α(S∗1) and R(S∗2)(1− λ(S∗1 , S∗)). By optimality of R∗, R(S∗2) ≤ R∗
and hence α(S∗1) ≥ R∗.
We now prove a stronger lower bound for the value α(S∗2) of the second level.
Proposition 4. (Bounding Level 2) α(S∗2) ≥ R
∗
1−λ(S∗1 ,S∗) .
Proof. The proof is similar to the one in Proposition 3.
R∗ =
α(S∗1)U(S∗1)
U(S∗) + u0
+
α(S∗2)U(S∗2)
U(S∗) + u0
·
(
1− U(S
∗
1)
U(S∗) + u0
)
=
α(S∗1)U(S∗1)
U(S∗1) + u0
· U(S
∗
1) + u0
U(S∗) + u0︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−λ(S∗2 ,S∗)
+α(S∗2) ·
U(S∗2)
U(S∗) + u0︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ(S∗2 ,S∗)
·
(
1− U(S
∗
1)
U(S∗) + u0
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−λ(S∗1 ,S∗)
=R(S∗1) · (1− λ(S∗2 , S∗)) + (α(S∗2)(1− λ(S∗1 , S∗))) · λ(S∗2 , S∗).
R∗ is a convex combination of and R(S∗1) and α(S∗2)(1−λ(S∗1 , S∗)). By optimality of R∗, R(S∗1) ≤ R∗
and α(S∗2) ≥ R
∗
(1−λ(S∗1 ,S∗)) .
The following example shows that it not always the case that the inequality proved above holds
if one considers the products in S∗2 separately. That is, the inequality r(x) ≥ R
∗
1−λ(S∗1 ,S∗) for all
x ∈ S∗2 is not always true.
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Example 3. Let X1 = {x11}, X2 = {x21, x22}, and X = X1 unionmulti X2. Let the revenues be
r(x11) = 10, r(x21) = 9, and r(x22) = 6 and the utilities be u(x11) = u(x21) = 1, u(x22) = 3,
and u0 = 1. The expected revenue for all possible subsets are given by
S R(S)
{x11} 5
{x21} 4.5
{x22} 4.5
{x11, x21} 5.3
{x11, x22} 4.88
{x21, x22} 5.4
{x11, x21, x22} 5.416
The optimal assortment is S∗ = {x11, x21, x22} with an expected revenue of R∗ = 5.416. By
definition of λ(·), we have
λ(S∗1 , S
∗) =
U(S∗1)
U(S∗) + u0
=
1
6
= 0.16.
It follows that r(x22) = 6 <
R∗
1−λ(S∗1 ,S∗) =
5.416
1−0.16 = 6.488, showing that the bound does not hold for
product x22.
However, the weaker bound holds for every product, and more generally, we have the following
proposition (a proof is provided in Appendix B).
Proposition 5. In every optimal assortment S∗, if Z ⊆ S∗i (i = 1, 2), then α(Z) ≥ R∗.
The converse of Proposition 5 does not hold: Example 4 presents an instance where the optimal
solution does not contain all the products with a revenue higher than R∗.
Example 4. We show that some products with revenue greater or equal than R∗ may not be
included in an optimal assortment. Let X1 = {x11}, X2 = {x21}, and X = X1 unionmulti X2. Let the
revenues be r(x11) = r(x21) = 1 and the utilities be u(x11) = 10, u(x21) = 1, and u0 = 1. Consider
the possible assortments and their expected revenues:
R({x11}) = u(x11)r(x11)u(x11)+u0 = 10·110+1 = 0.909
R({x21}) = u(x21)r(x21)u(x21)+u0 = 1·11+1 = 0.5
R({x11, x21}) = u(x11)r(x11)u(x11)+u(x21)+u0 +
(
1− u(x11)u(x11)+u(x21)+u0
)
· u(x21)r(x21)u(x11)+u(x21)+u0
= 10·110+1+1 +
(
1− 1010+1+1
)
· 1·110+1+1
= 1012 +
(
1− 1012
) · 110+1
= 0.8472
The optimal assortment is S∗ = {x11}. However, we have that r(x21) = 1 > R∗, but x21 is not part
of the optimal assortment.
The following corollary, whose proof is also in Appendix B, is a direct consequence of Proposition
5.
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Corollary 1. For any non-empty subset S0 ⊆ S∗, where S∗ is an optimal solution, we have
α(S0) ≥ R∗.
The corollary above implies that α({x}) = r(x) ≥ R∗ for all x ∈ S∗. Thus, every product in an
optimal assortment has a revenue greater than or equal to R∗.
In the following example we show that the well known revenue-ordered assortment strategy for
the assortment problem does not always lead to optimality.
Example 5 (Revenue-Ordered assortments are not optimal). Let X1 = {x11}, X2 = {x21}, and
X = X1 unionmultiX2. Let r(x11) = 10 and r(x21) = 12. Let the utilities be u(x11) = 10, u(x21) = 2, and
u0 = 1. A direct calculation shows that the revenues for all possible assortments under this setting
are:
S R(S)
{x11} 9.09
{x21} 8
{x11, x21} 8.12
The optimal assortment is S∗ = {x11}, yielding a revenue of R∗ = 9.09. However, the best
revenue ordered assortment is S′ = {x11, x21}, obtaining a revenue of R′ = 8.12, this means that
the revenue-ordered assortment strategy provides an approximation ratio of R
′
R∗ ≈ 89.3% for this
particular instance.
Up to this point, we understand some properties of optimal assortments, but we don’t know
the solution structure or an algorithm to calculate it. In the following section we propose a natural
extension of the revenue-ordered assortment strategy, the revenue-ordered by level assortments, and
show that guarantees optimality, and it can be computed in polynomial time.
4 Optimality of Revenue-Ordered Assortments by level
This section proves that optimal assortments under the SML are revenue-ordered by level, general-
izing the traditional results for the MNL (Talluri and Van Ryzin, 2004). As a corollary, the optimal
assortment problem under the SML is polynomial-time solvable.
Definition 1 (Revenue-Ordered Assortment by Level). Denote by Nij the set of all products in
level i with a revenue of at least rij (1 ≤ j ≤ mi) and fix Ni0 = ∅ by convention. A revenue-ordered
assortment by level is a set S = N1j1 unionmultiN2j2 ⊆ X for some 0 ≤ j1 ≤ m1 and 0 ≤ j2 ≤ m2. We use
A to denote the set of revenue-ordered assortments by level.
When an assortment S = S1 unionmulti S2 is not revenue-ordered by level, it follows that
∃k ∈ {1, 2}, z ∈ Xk \ Sk, y ∈ Sk : r(z) ≥ r(y).
We say that S has a gap, the gap is at level k, and z belongs to the gap. We now define the concept
of first gap, which is heavily used in the proof.
Definition 2 (First Gap of an Assortment). Let S = S1 unionmulti S2 be an assortment with a gap and let
k be the smallest level with a gap. Let rˆ = maxy∈Xk\Sk r(y) be the maximum revenue of a product
in level k not contained in Sk. The first gap of S is a set of products G ⊆ Xk \S defined as follows:
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• If maxx∈Sk r(x) < rˆ, then the gap G consists of all products with higher revenues than the
products in assortment S, i.e.,
G = {y ∈ Xk \ Sk | r(y) ≥ max
x∈Sk
r(x)}.
• Otherwise, when maxx∈Sk r(x) ≥ rˆ, define the following quantities:
rM = min
x∈Sk
r(x)≥rˆ
r(x) and rm = max
x∈Sk
r(x)≤rˆ
r(x). (7)
The set G contains products with revenues in [rm, rM ], i.e.,
G = {y ∈ Xk \ Sk | rm ≤ r(y) ≤ rM}.
We are now in a position to state the main theorem of this paper.
Theorem 1. Under the SML, any optimal assortment is revenue-ordered by level.
The proof is fairly technical, and is relegated to Appendix B. The intuition behind it is the
following: Assume that S is an optimal solution with at least one gap as in Definition 2. Let G be
the first gap of S, and that G occurs at level k. Define Sk = H ∪ T with H,T ⊆ Xk and
H = {x ∈ Sk | r(x) ≥ max
g∈G
r(g)}
and
T = {x ∈ Sk | r(x) ≤ min
g∈G
r(g)}.
We call the set H as the head and the set T is called the tail. We prove that is always possible to
select an assortment that is revenue-ordered by level and has revenue greater than R(S) (contra-
dicting optimality). The proof shows that such an assortment can be obtained either by including
the gap G in S or by eliminating T from S. Figure 1 illustrates these concepts visually.
+ −
H
H ∪G ∪ T
H ∪ T
Revenue
Graphical representation of a gap on a fixed level
All products on the assortment No products selected Possibly some products missing
Candidate 2, T is removed
Candidate 1, G is added
Original assortment
Revenue
H G T
Figure 1: Representation of a level containing a gap G at the top, and the two proposed candidates
fixing the gap by either adding G, or removing T .
The following corollary follows directly from the fact that there are at most O(|X|2) revenue-
ordered assortments by level and the fact that the revenue obtained from a given assortment can
be computed in polynomial time.
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Corollary 2. The assortment problem under the sequential multinomial logit is polynomial-time
solvable.
5 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we analyse numerically the performance of revenue-ordered assortments (RO)
against our proposed strategy (ROL) by varying the number of products, the distribution of rev-
enues and utilities in each level, and the utility of the outside option. In our experiments with up
to 100 products, we found that the optimality gap can be as large as 26.319%.
Each family or class of instances we tested is defined by three numbers: the number of products
in the first and second level (n1, n2), and the utility of the outside option u0. In total, we tested 20
classes or family of instances, each containing 100 instances. In each specific instance, revenues and
product utilities are drawn from an uniform distribution between 0 and 10. We ran both strategies
(RO and ROL) and we report the average and the worst optimality gap for the RO strategy, and
the time taken for both strategies. These numerical experiments were conducted in Python 3.6, at
a computer with 4 processors (each with 3.6 GHz CPU) and 16 GB of RAM. The computing time
is reported in seconds is the average among the 100 instances in each class (or family).
(n1, n2) u0
RO ROL
Avg. Gap (%) Worst Gap (%) Avg. Time RO (s) Avg. Time ROL (s)
(5,5) 0 0 0 0 0
(5,5) 1 1.811 18.098 0 0.001
(5,5) 2.5 3.43 17.416 0 0
(5,5) 5 3.413 13.183 0 0
(5,5) 10 1.923 12.406 0 0.001
(10,10) 0 0 0 0 0.004
(10,10) 1 3.23 20.669 0.001 0.004
(10,10) 2.5 5.613 20.359 0.001 0.004
(10,10) 5 5.975 15.521 0.001 0.004
(10,10) 10 5.347 15.694 0.001 0.004
(20,20) 0 0 0 0.003 0.04
(20,20) 1 4.331 19.427 0.003 0.04
(20,20) 2.5 8.523 21.873 0.003 0.039
(20,20) 5 9.776 19.719 0.003 0.038
(20,20) 10 9.682 18.771 0.003 0.039
(50,50) 0 0 0 0.016 0.564
(50,50) 1 6.315 26.319 0.016 0.549
(50,50) 2.5 11.662 24.117 0.016 0.55
(50,50) 5 14.94 24.445 0.016 0.551
(50,50) 10 15.543 22.232 0.016 0.547
Table 1: Numerical experiments comparing the revenue ordered assortment strategy (RO) and the
revenue-ordered assortments by level (ROL, which is optimal). For each class of instances, we
display the average optimality gap and the worst-case gap, as well as the computing time.
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Based on the results on Table 1 we can observe the following:
1. As expected, although ROL takes more time than RO, it takes a small amount of time to
solve the instances.
2. When the utility of the outside option is u0 = 0, the average and worst gap are identically
zero. This is because in those cases, the optimal solution is simply selecting the highest
revenue product and therefore both strategies coincide.
3. The average gap is generally increasing as the outside option utility increases. With a high
outside option, we typically expect to select more products to counterbalance the effect of
the no choice alternative. This can amplify the difference between ROL and RO as the
likelihood that the optimal solution of the revenue-ordered by level is indeed a revenue ordered
assortment decreases.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
This paper studied the assortment optimization problem under the Sequential Multinomial Logit
(SML), a discrete choice model that generalizes the multinomial logit (MNL). Under the SML
model, products are partitioned into two levels. When a consumer is presented with such an
assortment, she first considers products in the first level and, if none of them is appropriate,
products in the second level. The SML is a special case of the Perception Adjusted Luce Model
(PALM) recently proposed by Echenique, Saito, and Tserenjigmid (2018). It can explain many
behavioural phenomena such as the attraction, compromise, and similarity effects which cannot be
explained by the MNL model or any discrete choice model based on random utility.
The paper showed that the seminal concept of revenue-ordered assortments can be generalized
to the SML. In particular, the paper proved that all optimal assortments under the SML are
revenue-ordered by level, a natural generalization of revenue-ordered assortments. As a corollary,
assortment optimization under the SML is polynomial-time solvable. This result is particularly
interesting given that the SML does not satisfy the regularity condition.
The main open issue regarding this research is to generalize the results to the PALM, which has
an arbitrary number of levels. Note that one can easily extend the algorithm of revenue-ordered by
level to the PALM model and it would take at most O(|X|k) time where k is the number of levels
†. We executed our algorithm over a series of PALM instances by varying the number of levels and
the revenue-ordered assortment algorithm always returned the optimal solution. Our conjecture is
that the optimality result of revenue ordered assortments by level holds for the general PALM, but
the problem remains open. We note that our proof technique cannot be directly applied to answer
this question as some of the bounds developed in Section 3 do not hold for k > 2.
A second interesting research avenue is to consider a new discrete choice model that allows
decision makers to change the order in which the levels are presented to consumers. In the SML,
the level ordering is intrinsic to products, but one may consider settings in which decision makers
can choose, not only what to show, but also the priority associated with each of the displayed
products. Another research direction is to study the assortment optimziation problem under the
SML with cardinality or space constraints. Finally, it is important to develop efficient procedures
†Note that O(|X|k) is the number assortments that are revenue-ordered by level.
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to estimate the parameters of the SML model based on historical data (e.g., van Ryzin and Vulcano
(2017)).
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A The Perception-Adjusted Luce Model
In this section, for the purpose of completeness, we describe the perception-adjusted Luce model
(PALM) proposed by in Echenique, Saito, and Tserenjigmid (2018). The authors recover the role
of perception among alternatives using a weak order %. The idea is that if x  y then x tends to
be perceived before y, and whenever x ∼ y then x and y are perceived at the same time.
A Perception-Adjusted Luce Model (PALM) is described by two parameters: a weak order %,
and a utility function u. She perceives elements of an offered set S ⊆ X sequentially according to
the equivalence classes induced by % (in our representation, we called them levels). Each alternative
is selected with probability defined by µ, a function depending on u and closely related to Luce’s
formula.
Definition 3. A Perception-Adjusted Luce Model (PALM) is a pair (%, u), where the probability
of choosing a product x when offering the set S is:
ρ(x, S) = µ(x, S) ·
∏
α∈S/%:α>x
(1− µ(α, S)), (8)
where:
µ(x, S) =
u(x)∑
y∈S u(y) + u0
. (9)
S/ % corresponds to the set of equivalence classes in which % partitions S.
Thus, the probability of choosing a product is the probability of not choosing any products
belonging to the previous levels and then selecting the product according a Luce’s Model considering
all the offered products. We can also write the probability of not choosing any product of the
assortment:
ρ(x0, S) = 1−
∑
y∈S
ρ(y, S), (10)
or equivalently, as the probability of not choosing on each one of the equivalence classes.
ρ(x0, S) =
∏
α∈S/%
(1− µ(α, S)) (11)
In the Perception-Adjusted Luce Model, the customer makes her selection following a sequential
procedure. She considers the alternatives in sequence, following a predefined perception priority
order. Choosing an alternative is conditioned to not choosing any other alternative perceived before.
If none of the offered alternatives is selected, then the outside option is chosen.
Is interesting to note that setting the outside option utility to zero does not result in zero choice
probability for the outside option. As explained in Echenique, Saito, and Tserenjigmid (2018),
there are two sources behind choosing the outside option in the PALM. One is the utility of the
outside option, which is to the same extent as in Luce’s model with an outside option. The second,
and to our appreciation the one that differentiate this model from other models of choice, is due the
sequential nature of choice. When a customer chooses sequentially following a perception priority
order, it can happen that she checks all products in the offered set without making a choice. When
this occurs, this seems to increase or bias the value of the outside option probability.
Another consequence of the functional form of the outside option probability (Equation (11)),
is the ability to model choice overload. In addition, this model allows violations to regularity and
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violations to stochastic transitivity. The interested reader is referred to Echenique, Saito, and
Tserenjigmid (2018) for more details.
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B Appendix: Proofs
In this section we provide the proofs missing from the main text.
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof of this proposition relies on the following technical lemma.
Lemma B.1. Consider an assortment S = S1 unionmulti S2 and Z ⊆ Si for some i = 1, 2. R(S) can be
expressed in terms of the following convex combinations:
• If Z ⊆ S1,
R(S) =R(S \ Z) · (1− λ(Z, S))
+
[
α(Z)− α(S2)U(S2)(U(S2) + u0)(1− λ(Z, S)
(U(S)− U(Z) + u0)2
]
· λ(Z, S). (12)
• if Z ⊆ S2,
R(S) =R(S \ Z) · (1− λ(Z, S))
+
[
α(Z)(U(S2) + u0)
U(S) + u0
+
α(S2 \ Z)(U(S2)− U(Z))
U(S)− U(Z) + u0 ·
U(S1)
U(S) + u0
]
· λ(Z, S). (13)
Proof. For Z ⊆ X and Z0 ⊆ Z, we have:
α(Z \ Z0) =
∑
x∈Z\Z0 r(x)u(x)
U(Z \ Z0)
=
∑
x∈Z r(x)u(x)
U(Z \ Z0) −
α(Z0)U(Z0)
U(Z \ Z0)
=
∑
x∈Z r(x)u(x)
U(Z \ Z0) ·
U(Z)
U(Z)
− α(Z0)U(Z0)
U(Z \ Z0)
=
∑
x∈Z r(x)u(x)
U(Z)︸ ︷︷ ︸
α(Z)
· U(Z)
U(Z)− U(Z0) −
α(Z0)U(Z0)
U(Z)− U(Z0)
=
α(Z)U(Z)− α(Z0)U(Z0)
U(Z)− U(Z0)
=
α(Z)U(Z)− α(Z0)U(Z0)
U(Z)− U(Z0) , (14)
which can be rewritten as
α(Z \ Z0)(U(Z)− U(Z0)) = α(Z)U(Z)− α(Z0)U(Z0). (15)
Note also that, when Z0 = Z, α(Z \ Z0) = α(∅) = 0.
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The rest of the proof is by case analysis on the level. If Z ⊆ S1, λ(Z, S) = U(Z)U(S)+u0 . We have:
R(S) =
α(S1)U(S1)
U(S) + u0
+
α(S2)U(S2)
U(S) + u0
·
(
1− U(S1)
U(S) + u0
)
=
α(S1)U(S1)− α(Z)U(Z)
U(S) + u0
+
α(Z)U(Z)
U(S) + u0
+
α(S2)U(S2)
U(S) + u0
·
(
1− U(S1)
U(S) + u0
)
=
α(S1)U(S1)− α(Z)U(Z)
U(S) + u0
· U(S)− U(Z) + u0
U(S)− U(Z) + u0 +
α(Z)U(Z)
U(S) + u0
+
α(S2)U(S2)
U(S) + u0
·
(
1− U(S1)
U(S) + u0
)
=
α(S1)U(S1)− α(Z)U(Z)
U(S)− U(Z) + u0 · (1− λ(Z, S)) + α(Z)λ(Z, S)
+
α(S2)U(S2)(U(S2) + u0)
(U(S)− U(Z) + u0)2 ·
(
U(S)− U(Z) + u0
U(S) + u0
)2
,
where we first add and subtract α(Z)U(Z)U(S)+u0 , and multiply and divide the first term by (U(S) −
U(Z) + u0). The last step uses the definition of λ(Z, S) and multiplies and divides the last term
by (U(S)−U(Z) + u0)2. Now applying Equation (15) to S1 and Z in the last equation, we obtain
R(S) =
α(S1 \ Z)(U(S1)− U(Z))
U(S)− U(Z) + u0 · (1− λ(Z, S)) + α(Z)λ(Z, S) +
α(S2)U(S2)(U(S2) + u0)
(U(S)− U(Z) + u0)2 · (1− λ(Z, S))
2
=
[
α(S1 \ Z)(U(S1)− U(Z))
U(S)− U(Z) + u0 +
α(S2)U(S2)(U(S2) + u0)
(U(S)− U(Z) + u0)2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
R(S1\Z∪S2)
· (1− λ(Z, S))
+
[
α(Z)− α(S2)U(S2)(U(S2) + u0) (1− λ(Z, S))
(U(S)− U(Z) + u0)2
]
· λ(Z, S)
=R(S1 \ Z ∪ S2) (1− λ(Z, S)) +
[
α(Z)− α(S2)U(S2)(U(S2) + u0) (1− λ(Z, S))
(U(S)− U(Z) + u0)2
]
· λ(Z, S)
=R(S \ Z) (1− λ(Z, S)) +
[
α(Z)− α(S2)U(S2)(U(S2) + u0) (1− λ(Z, S))
(U(S)− U(Z) + u0)2
]
· λ(Z, S).
If Z ⊆ S2, the proof is essentially similar. It also uses λ(Z, S) = U(Z)U(S)+u0 and apply Equation
(15) to S2 and Z to obtain
R(S) =
α(S1)U(S1)
U(S) + u0
+
α(S2)U(S2)
U(S) + u0
·
(
1− U(S1)
U(S) + u0
)
=
α(S1)U(S1)
U(S)− U(Z) + u0 · (1− λ(Z, S)) +
α(Z)U(Z)(U(S2) + u0)
(U(S) + u0)2
+
(α(S2)U(S2)− α(Z)U(Z))(U(S2) + u0)
(U(S) + u0)2
=
α(S1)U(S1)
U(S)− U(Z) + u0 · (1− λ(Z, S)) +
α(S2 \ Z)(U(S2)− U(Z))(U(S2)− U(Z) + u0)
(U(S) + u0)2
+
α(S2 \ Z)(U(S2)− U(Z))U(Z)
(U(S) + u0)2
+
α(Z)U(Z)(U(S2) + u0)
(U(S) + u0)2
,
where we multiply and divide the first term by (U(S)−U(Z)+u0) and use the definition of λ(Z, S)
and then add and subtract α(Z)U(Z)(U(S2)+u0)
(U(S)+u0)2
. The last step uses Equation (15) and adds and
subtracts α(S2\Z)(U(S2)−U(Z))U(Z)
(U(S)+u0)2
. The goal of this manipulation is to form R(S \Z) (1− λ(Z, S)).
We then obtain
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=
α(S1)U(S1)
U(S)− U(Z) + u0 · (1− λ(Z, S)) +
α(S2 \ Z)(U(S2)− U(Z))(U(S2)− U(Z) + u0)
(U(S) + u0)2
+
α(S2 \ Z)(U(S2)− U(Z))U(Z)
(U(S) + u0)2
+
α(Z)U(Z)(U(S2) + u0)
(U(S) + u0)2
=
α(S1)U(S1)
U(S)− U(Z) + u0 · (1− λ(Z, S)) +
α(S2 \ Z)(U(S2)− U(Z))(U(S2)− U(Z) + u0)
(U(S)− U(Z) + u0)2 (1− λ(Z, S))
2
+
α(S2 \ Z)(U(S2)− U(Z))U(Z)
(U(S) + u0)2
+
α(Z)U(Z)(U(S2) + u0)
(U(S) + u0)2
=
[
α(S1)U(S1)
U(S)− U(Z) + u0 +
α(S2 \ Z)(U(S2)− U(Z))(U(S2)− U(Z) + u0)
(U(S)− U(Z) + u0)2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
R(S1∪S2\Z)
· (1− λ(Z, S))
+
α(Z)U(Z)(U(S2) + u0)
(U(S) + u0)2
+
α(S2 \ Z)(U(S2)− U(Z))U(Z)
(U(S) + u0)2
− λ(Z, S) (1− λ(Z, S))α(S2 \ Z)(U(S2)− U(Z))(U(S2)− U(Z) + u0)
(U(S)− U(Z) + u0)2 ,
where the second step multiplies and divides the second term by (U(S) − U(Z) + u0) and uses
the definition of λ(Z, S). The third step splits the second term by expressing (1 − λ(Z, S))2 as
(1 − λ(Z, S)) − λ(Z, S)(1 − λ(Z, S)) in order to identify the term R(S1 ∪ S2 \ Z). Now, putting
together the remaining terms, we obtain:
R(S) =R(S1 ∪ S2 \ Z) (1− λ(Z, S))
+λ(Z, S)
[
α(Z)(U(S2) + u0)
U(S) + u0
+
α(S2 \ Z)(U(S2)− U(Z))
U(S) + u0
− (1− λ(Z, S))α(S2 \ Z)(U(S2)− U(Z))(U(S2)− U(Z) + u0)
(U(S)− U(Z) + u0)2
]
=R(S1 ∪ S2 \ Z) (1− λ(Z, S))
+ λ(Z, S) ·
[
α(Z)(U(S2) + u0)
U(S) + u0
+
α(S2 \ Z)(U(S2)− U(Z))
U(S) + u0
[
1−
(
1− U(S1)
U(S)− U(Z) + u0
)]]
=R(S \ Z) (1− λ(Z, S)) +
[
α(Z)(U(S2) + u0)
U(S) + u0
+
α(S2 \ Z)(U(S2)− U(Z))
U(S)− U(Z) + u0 ·
U(S1)
U(S) + u0
]
· λ(Z, S).
where the second line uses the definition of λ(Z, S) to factorize the expression and the last step
just simplifies the resulting expressions.
Now we can continue with the proof of Proposition 5. Let Z ⊆ S∗i for some i = 1, 2. Consider
first the case in which the optimal solution S∗ contains only products from level i (i ∈ {1, 2}).
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Then,
R∗ =
∑
y∈S∗ r(y)u(y)∑
y∈S∗ u(y) + u0
=
∑
y∈S∗\Z r(y)u(y)∑
y∈S∗\Z u(y) + u0
·
∑
y∈S∗ u(y)− U(Z) + u0∑
y∈S∗ u(y) + u0
+
α(Z)U(Z)∑
y∈S∗ u(y) + u0
=
∑
y∈S∗\Z r(y)u(y)∑
y∈S∗\Z u(y) + u0︸ ︷︷ ︸
R(S∗\Z)
· (1− λ(Z, S∗)) + α(Z)λ(Z, S∗)
= R(S∗ \ Z) · (1− λ(Z, S∗)) + α(Z)λ(Z, S∗).
The optimal solution is a convex combination of R(S∗ \Z) and α(Z). By optimality of R∗, R(S∗ \
Z) ≤ R∗ and hence α(Z) ≥ R∗.
Consider the case in which the solution is non-empty in both levels, and suppose that α(Z) < R∗.
We now show that this is not possible. The proof considers two independent cases, depending on
the level that contains Z.
If Z ⊆ S∗1 , by Lemma B.1, the revenue of S∗ can be expressed as
R(S∗) = R(S∗ \ Z) · (1− λ(Z, S∗)) +
[
α(Z)− α(S
∗
2 )U(S2)(U(S
∗
2 ) + u0)(1− λ(Z, S∗)
(U(S∗)− U(Z) + u0)2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΓZ
·λ(Z, S∗). (16)
R∗ is a convex combination of R(S∗ \ Z) and ΓZ . We show that ΓZ < R∗.
ΓZ = α(Z)− α(S
∗
2 )U(S
∗
2 )(U(S
∗
2 ) + u0) (1− λ(Z, S∗))
(U(S∗)− U(Z) + u0)2
= α(Z)− α(S
∗
2 )U(S
∗
2 )(U(S
∗
2 ) + u0)
(U(S∗)− U(Z) + u0)(U(S∗) + u0) /using definition of λ(Z, S
∗)
= α(Z)− α(S
∗
2 )U(S
∗
2 )(1− λ(S∗1 , S∗))
(U(S∗)− U(Z) + u0) /by definition of λ(S
∗
1 , S
∗)
≤ α(Z)− R
∗U(S∗2 )
U(S∗)− U(Z) + u0 /Using proposition 4
< R∗
(
1− U(S
∗
2 )
U(S∗)− U(Z) + u0
)
/using the assumption α(Z) < R∗
< R∗.
Since R(S∗/Z) ≤ R∗, we have that R∗ < R∗ and hence it must be the case that α(Z) ≥ R∗.
Now, if Z ⊆ S∗2 , by Lemma B.1, the revenue of S∗ can be expressed as
R(S∗) = R(S∗ \ Z) (1− λ(Z, S∗))
+
[
α(Z)(U(S∗2 ) + u0)
U(S∗) + u0
+
α(S∗2 \ Z)(U(S∗2 )− U(Z))
U(S∗)− U(Z) + u0 ·
U(S∗1 )
U(S∗) + u0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΓZ
·λ(Z, S∗). (17)
24
R∗ is thus a convex combination of R(S∗ \ Z) and ΓZ . Again, we show that ΓZ < R∗:
ΓZ =
α(Z)(U(S∗2 ) + u0)
U(S∗) + u0
+
α(S∗2 \ Z)(U(S∗2 )− U(Z))
U(S∗)− U(Z) + u0 ·
U(S∗1 )
U(S∗) + u0
= α(Z)(1− λ(S∗1 , S∗)) +
α(S∗2 \ Z)(U(S∗2 )− U(Z))
U(S∗)− U(Z) + u0 · λ(S
∗
1 , S
∗) /by definition of λ(S∗1 , S
∗)
< α(Z)(1− λ(S∗1 , S∗)) +
α(S∗2 \ Z)(U(S∗2 )− U(Z))
U(S∗2 )− U(Z) + u0︸ ︷︷ ︸
R(S∗2\Z)
·λ(S∗1 , S∗) /replacing U(S∗) by U(S∗2 )
< R∗(1− λ(S∗1 , S∗)) +R(S∗2 \ Z) · λ(S∗1 , S∗) /using that α(Z) < R∗
< R∗(1− λ(S∗1 , S∗)) +R(S∗2 \ Z)λ(S∗1 , S∗) /Using the optimality of R∗
< R∗.
Hence, it must be the case that α(Z) ≥ R∗, completing the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. By Proposition 5, we have α({x}) = r(x) ≥ R∗ for all x ∈ S∗. For each set
S0 ⊆ S∗, we have:
α(S0) =
∑
x∈S0 u(x)r(x)∑
x∈S0 u(x)
≥R∗
∑
x∈S0 u(x)∑
x∈S0 u(x)
/ by Proposition 5
=R∗.
Proof of Theorem 1. Assume that S is an optimal solution with at least one gap, G is the first gap
of S, and G occurs at level k. Define Sk = H ∪ T with H,T ⊆ Xk and
H = {x ∈ Sk | r(x) ≥ max
g∈G
r(g)}
and
T = {x ∈ Sk | r(x) ≤ min
g∈G
r(g)}.
In the following, the set H is called the head and the set T is called the tail. We prove that is
always possible to select an assortment that is revenue-ordered by level and has revenue greater
than R(S). The proof shows that such an assortment can be obtained either by including the gap
G in S or by eliminating T from S. Figure 1 illustrates these concepts visually. The proof is by
case analysis on the level of G.
Consider first the case where G is in the first level. We can define S = S1unionmultiS2, with S1 = H ∪T
as defined above and S2 ⊆ X2. The revenue for S is
R(S1 ∪ S2) = α(S1)U(S1)
U(S) + u0
+
(
1− U(S1)
(U(S) + u0)
)
· α(S2)U(S2)
U(S) + u0
=
α(H)U(H)
U(S) + u0
+
α(T )U(T )
U(S) + u0
+
U(S2) + u0
(U(S) + u0)2
· α(S2)U(S2)
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where we used Proposition 1 on S1 for deriving the second equality. We show that assortment H∪S2
or assortment H ∪G∪T ∪S2 provides a revenue greater than R(S = H ∪T ∪S2), contradicting our
optimality assumption for S. The proof characterizes the differences between the revenues of S and
the two considered assortments, adds those two differences, and shows that this value is strictly
less than zero, implying that at least one of the differences is strictly negative and hence that one
of these assortments has a revenue larger than R(S). R(H ∪ S2) can be expressed as
α(H)U(H)
U(H) + U(S2) + u0
+
U(S2) + u0
(U(H) + U(S2) + u0)2
· α(S2)U(S2). (18)
Let θ = U(H) + U(T ) + U(S2) + u0 (or, equivalently, θ = U(S) + u0). The difference R(H ∪ T ∪
S2)−R(H ∪ S2) is
U(T )
θ(θ − U(T ))
[
−α(H)U(H) + α(T )(θ − U(T ))− α(S2)U(S2)(U(S2) + u0)(2(θ − U(T )) + U(T ))
θ(θ − U(T ))
]
. (19)
R(H ∪G ∪ T ∪ S2) can be expressed as
1
U(S) + U(G) + u0
· [α(H)U(H) + α(G)U(G) + α(T )U(T )] + U(S2) + u0
(U(S) + U(G) + u0)2
· α(S2)U(S2).
The difference R(H ∪ T ∪ S2)−R(H ∪G ∪ T ∪ S2) is given by
U(G)
θ(θ + U(G))
·
[
α(H)U(H) + α(T )U(T )− α(G)θ + α(S2)U(S2)(U(S2) + u0)(2θ + U(G))
θ(θ + U(G))
]
. (20)
By optimality of S, these two differences must be positive. However, their sum, dropping the
positive multiplying term on each difference, which must also be positive, is given by
(19) + (20) = α(T )θ − α(G)θ + α(S2)U(S2)(U(S2) + u0)
θ
·
[
2θ + U(G)
θ + U(G)
− 2(θ − U(T )) + U(T )
(θ − U(T ))
]
= (α(T )− α(G))θ + α(S2)U(S2)(U(S2) + u0)
θ
·
[
1 +
θ
θ + U(G)
− 2− U(T )
(θ − U(T ))
]
= (α(T )− α(G))θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0, by Proposition 2 and θ≥0
+
α(S2)U(S2)(U(S2) + u0)
θ
·

(
θ
θ + U(G)
− 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
− U(T )
(θ − U(T ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
 < 0
which contradicts the optimality of S.
Consider now the case where the gap is in the second level. Using the definition of the head
and the tail discussed above, S can be written as S = S1 unionmultiH ∪ T. The revenue R(S) is given by
R(S1∪H∪T ) = α(S1)U(S1)
θ
+
α(H)U(H)
θ
+
α(T )U(T )
θ
−U(S1)α(H)U(H)
θ2
−U(S1)α(T )U(T )
θ2
(21)
and the proof follows the same strategy as for the case of the first level. The revenue R(S1 ∪H) is
given by
R(S1 ∪H) = α(S1)U(S1)
θ − U(T ) +
α(H)U(H)
θ − U(T ) −
U(S1)α(H)U(H)
(θ − U(T ))2 (22)
and the difference R(S1 ∪H ∪ T )−R(S1 ∪H) by
U(T )
θ(θ − U(T )) ·
[
−α(S1)U(S1)− α(H)U(H) + α(T )(θ − U(T ))
+
α(H)U(H)U(S1)(2θ − U(T ))
θ(θ − U(T )) −
U(S1)α(T )(θ − U(T ))
θ
]
(23)
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The revenue R(S1 ∪H ∪G ∪ T ) is given by
α(S1)U(S1)
θ + U(G)
+
α(H)U(H)
θ + U(G)
+
α(G)U(G)
θ + U(G)
+
α(T )U(T )
θ + U(G)
− U(S1)
(θ + U(G))2
· [α(H)U(H) + α(G)U(G) + α(T )U(T )]
(24)
and the difference R(S1 ∪H ∪ T )−R(S1 ∪H ∪G ∪ T ) by
U(G)
θ(θ + U(G))
·
[
α(S1)U(S1) + α(H)U(H)− α(G)θ + α(T )U(T )
− α(H)U(H)U(S1)(2θ + U(G))
θ(θ + U(G))
− α(T )U(T )U(S1)(2θ + U(G))
θ(θ + U(G))
+
U(S1)α(G)θ
θ + U(G)
]
(25)
Adding (23) and (25) and dropping the positive multiplying terms on each difference gives
θ (α(T )− α(G)) + U(S1) (α(G)− α(T )) + U(S1)
[
α(T )U(T )
θ
− α(G)U(G)
θ + U(G)
]
+
U(S1)
θ
[
α(H)U(H)
(
1 +
θ
θ − U(T )
)
− α(H)U(H)
(
1 +
θ
θ + U(G)
)
− α(T )U(T )
(
1 +
θ
θ + U(G)
)]
= (θ − U(S1)) (α(T )− α(G)) + U(S1)α(H)U(H)
θ − U(T ) −
U(S1)
θ + U(G)
· [α(H)U(H) + α(G)U(G) + α(T )U(T )]
= (θ − U(S1)) (α(T )− α(G))︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0, by Proposition 2 and θ≥U(S1)
+
U(S1)α(H)U(H)(U(G) + U(T ))
(θ − U(T ))(θ + U(G)) −
U(S1)
θ + U(G)
· [α(G)U(G) + α(T )U(T )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Γ
(26)
Γ cannot be greater or equal than zero, since otherwise
U(S1)α(H)U(H)(U(G) + U(T ))
(θ − U(T ))(θ + U(G)) −
U(S1)
θ + U(G)
· [α(G)U(G) + α(T )U(T )] ≥ 0
U(S1)
(θ + U(G))
·
[
α(H)U(H)(U(G) + U(T ))
(θ − U(T )) − (α(G)U(G) + α(T )U(T ))
]
≥ 0. (27)
The factor on the left is always positive, so Inequality (27) implies that the term between brackets
is greater than zero. We now show that this contradicts the optimality of S. We do this by
manipulating Inequality (27) and showing that, if this inequality holds, then R(H) > R(S).
α(H)U(H)(U(G) + U(T ))
(θ − U(T )) − (α(G)U(G) + α(T )U(T )) ≥ 0
α(H)U(H)
(θ − U(T )) ≥
α(G)U(G) + α(T )U(T )
(U(G) + U(T ))
α(H)U(H)
(U(S1) + U(H) + u0)
≥ α(G)U(G) + α(T )U(T )
(U(G) + U(T ))
α(H)U(H)
(U(H) + u0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
R(H)
·
[
1− U(S1)
U(S1) + U(H) + u0
]
≥ α(G)U(G) + α(T )U(T )
(U(G) + U(T ))
R(H) ≥ R(H) · U(S1)
U(S1) + U(H) + u0︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
α(G)U(G) + α(T )U(T )
(U(G) + U(T ))
> R(S) · U(G) + U(T )
U(G) + U(T )
> R(S). (28)
27
Inequality (28) follows from Proposition 5 applied to T ⊂ S2, which implies α(T ) ≥ R(S), and
from Proposition 2, which implies α(G) ≥ α(T ) and hence α(G) ≥ R(S).
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